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Introduction 
Information retrieval-the retrieval, primarily, of documents or tex- 
tual material-is fundamentally a linguistic process. At the very least 
we must describe what we want and match that  description with 
descriptions of the information that is available to us. Furthermore, 
when we describe what we want, we must mean something by that  
description. This is a deceptively simple act, but such linguistic events 
have been the grist for philosophical analysis since Aristotle. Although 
there are complexities involved in referring to authors, document types, 
or other categories of information retrieval context, here I wish to focus 
on one of the most problematic activities in information retrieval: the 
description of the intellectual content of information items. And even 
though I take information retrieval to involve the description and 
retrieval of written text, what I say here is applicable to any information 
item whose intellectual content can be described €or retrieval-books, 
documents, images, audio clips, video clips, scientific specimens, engi- 
neering schematics, and so forth. For convenience, though, I will refer 
only to the description and retrieval of documents. 
The description of intellectual content can go wrong in many obvious 
ways. We may describe what we want incorrectly; we may describe it 
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correctly but in such general terms that  its description is useless for 
retrieval; or we may describe what we want correctly, but misinterpret 
the descriptions of available information, and thereby match our 
description of what we want incorrectly. From a linguistic point of view, 
we can be misunderstood in the process of retrieval in many ways. 
Because the philosophy of language deals specifically with how we are 
understood and mis-understood, it should have some use for under- 
standing the process of description in information retrieval. 
First, however, let us examine more closely the kinds of misunder- 
standings that can occur in information retrieval. We use language in 
searching for information in two principal ways. We use it to describe 
what we want and to discriminate what we want from other information 
that is available to us but that we do not want. Description and dis- 
crimination together articulate the goals of the information search 
process; they also delineate the two principal ways in which language 
can fail us in this process. Van Rijsbergen (1979) was the first to make 
this distinction, calling them “representation” and “discrimination.” 
The Retrieval Problem: 
Failures of Description 
A failure of description can occur in a number of ways. The most obvi- 
ous failure is when an  item of information is described incorrectly: a 
textbook on “economics” is described, for example, as being on “anthro- 
pology,” or a book by Mark Twain is described as being written by Henry 
James. But there are more subtle failures of description, too, such as 
when the description is generally correct but is beyond the comprehen- 
sion of the typical inquirer who might see it. An example of this is a book 
described as being about “plate tectonics” when the typical inquirer who 
is interested in theories of “continental drift” may not realize that “plate 
tectonics” is the more formal description of the same subject matter. In  
other situations, opposing views arise as to how a particular literature 
should be described; for example, some researchers may consider “cold 
fusion” to be a valid field of scientific research deserving its own cate- 
gory, while others see work on “cold fusion’’ as more appropriately sub- 
sumed under the rubric “crank theories” or “pseudo-science.” 
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When we look at just the reasonably correct or useful descriptions that 
can represent an item of information, this set of reasonable descriptions 
may be quite large. It has been shown empirically (Swanson, 1996), and 
argued theoretically (Blair, 1990), that the number of different descrip- 
tions that can represent the intellectual content of even a relatively short 
document may have no upper bound. This conclusion calls into question 
the notion of “exhaustive indexing‘‘-the assignment of all the index 
descriptions that could represent the intellectual content of an item of 
idormation. Some have argued that information retrieval systems 
should use all possible index terms to represent the intellectual content 
of a document-a strategy called “unlimited aliasing” (Furnas, Landauer, 
Gomez, & Dumais, 1987). Such a strategy ignores two things. First, there 
may be no upper bound to the number of words and phrases that can rep- 
resent the intellectual content of even a small item of information. 
Second, some of the many possible index terms will always be more use- 
ful for retrieval than others, so the assignment of any reasonable index 
terms to a document may not be the best indexing strategy-some index 
terms really are better than others, as Brooks (1993) has shown. 
The high number of reasonable descriptions is both good and bad. It 
is good in the sense that it is easy to come up with one or more reason- 
able index terms. But it is bad in the sense that because so many rea- 
sonable descriptions for a document exist, a searcher may have a 
difficult time anticipating the ones actually assigned to the documents 
of interest, and further, documents that have the same intellectual con- 
tent might be described in a number of different ways (e.g., one 
described as concerning “continental drift” whereas another on the same 
topic is described as concerning “tectonic plates”). 
The Retrieval Problem: 
Failures of Discrimination 
Although the process of description is primarily focused on an individ- 
ual document or category of information, the process of discrimination 
takes a broader view of the representation problem. It is not concerned 
only with individual documents or categories of information, but also 
with the relationship between the desired document(s) and the other doc- 
uments that are available to the inquirer. The goal of discrimination is to 
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distinguish, by means of description, documents that are likely to be use- 
ful to the inquirer from available documents with similar intellectual 
content that are not likely to be useful. The ability to discriminate 
between useful and useless information establishes a continuum of 
description that can be characterized as ranging from specific (highly dis- 
criminating) to general (less discriminating) terms. The most obvious 
failure of discrimination is a description of the intellectual content of the 
desired document that is too general to distinguish it from the intellec- 
tual content of useless documents. For example, if the subject description 
“computers” were added to all the books and journals in a computer sci- 
ence library, it would have no discriminating power at all within that 
library. Such failure of discrimination is too obvious to be commonplace, 
but a more insidious form of discrimination failure can occur with even 
the most thoughtfully applied indexing descriptions. This failure hap- 
pens when a description identifies a relatively small number of docu- 
ments in an information retrieval system, and thus discriminates well, 
but during the lifetime of the system, more and more documents 
described in the same way are added. Eventually, the number of docu- 
ments described in this way reaches a point at which the description, by 
itself, does not discriminate well enough to be of use to inquirers; that is, 
when the description is used by itself as a search term, it retrieves more 
documents than inquirers are willing to look through to find what they 
want (Blair, 1980). 
Of course, the point at which a description fails to discriminate well 
is not a precise number and can be contingent on many factors, includ- 
ing the persistence of the inquirers using that description and the avail- 
ability of other descriptions that can reduce the size of the 
less-discriminating category of information. Some inquirers are signifi- 
cantly more persistent or motivated than others and more willing to 
browse through large sets of retrieved documents. Such persistence 
often depends on the importance of finding the desired documents and 
the time available for the search. On the other hand, using other 
descriptions may reduce the number of items in a particular category. 
Time periods are frequently used to qualify a less-discriminating 
description, such as when one asks for only the most recent items 
described as being in the broad category of “computer science.” 
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Recall and Precision 
Any discussion of failure in information retrieval calls to mind the two 
complementary measures of retrieval performance: recall, which is the 
percentage of relevant documents retrieved, and precision, which is the 
percentage of retrieved documents that are relevant (Blair & Maron, 
1985). In general, we can say that failures of description lead to low 
recall, whereas failures of discrimination tend to lower precision. Recall 
and precision are known to trade off in a rough and imprecise way- 
higher levels of recall are achieved at  the expense of lower levels of pre- 
cision, and vice versa. This effect suggests that description and 
discrimination may trade off in similar ways. Describing what we want 
in the most inclusive (that is, general) terms may lead to the construction 
of search queries that will be inclusive, but do not discriminate well (i.e., 
recall will be high and precision low). On the other hand, making our 
search queries as discriminating (that is, precise) as possible may lead to 
queries that do not describe what we want very inclusively (i.e., precision 
will be high and recall low). As in the case with recall and precision, the 
trade-off between description and discrimination is rough and imprecise. 
The Processes of Description 
and Discrimination 
The proliferation of electronic document collections, in particular the 
ubiquity of the World Wide Web (WWW, or Web), and the wide avail- 
ability of Internet search engines have placed the tools of information 
retrieval in the hands of anyone with access to the Web. Individuals who 
in the past would have had to consult professional searchers such as 
librarians can now conduct their own searches. Such wide accessibility 
to public domain information can only please advocates of a free and 
open democratic society, but the widespread use of Internet search 
engines may be changing the way we ask for information. When inquir- 
ers asked a professional searcher for help in finding information, they 
could describe what they wanted using all the subtleties and nuances of 
natural language expression. The professional searcher, in turn, could 
clarify the inquirers’ requests by asking appropriate questions. Now that 
typical inquirers conduct their own searches using search engines, much 
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of the subtlety of the interaction between inquirers and professional 
searchers has been lost. The typical information request submitted to an 
Internet search engine today is comprised of only a few words-often 
only one. As a consequence, it is important that we examine exactly 
what is meant by individual words when they are used to request (that 
is, to describe) information with a particular intellectual content. 
Another change taking place in the information retrieval process is the 
dramatic growth in size of available document collections. Everyone is 
aware of how the Web is growing, of course, but even private document 
collections such as institutional and corporate intranets and document 
databases continue to grow at  a spectacular rate. The reason for this is 
largely economic. We have reached the point with electronic document 
collections at  which the cost of examining and discarding materials, such 
as Web pages that have outlived their usefulness, is higher than the cost 
of simply keeping them. As a result, we have many electronic collections 
that are never or rarely weeded of obsolete documents. The resulting col- 
lections of electronic information are, like the Internet, growing without 
any clear upper bound. But as document collections grow larger and 
larger, a subtle change in the information retrieval process is taking 
place. Instead of the goal of search query formulation being primarily the 
description of what is wanted, the overriding goal of query formulation 
has become the discrimination of small numbers of desirable documents 
from increasingly large numbers of unwanted documents. 
What Do Descriptions Mean? 
Because of the dramatic and seemingly inevitable growth in the size 
of information retrieval systems and the many ways that descriptions of 
information can go wrong, if we are to improve the complementary 
processes of describing what we want and describing what is available 
to us, it is important that we examine as closely as possible the activity 
of describing the intellectual content of information. At the very begin- 
ning Qf this discussion, I stated the obvious when I said, “when we 
describe what we want, we must mean something by that description.” 
But what exactly do we mean when we describe what we want? A decade 
and a half ago, van Rijsbergen (1986a) wrote that one of the most con- 
spicuously absent components of information retrieval theory had been 
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an explicit, formal notion of meaning. It is here that the philosophy of 
language may provide us with some guidance. (The complementary 
nature of the indexing and searching processes was a major theme of 
Blair [19901. An earlier attempt to reduce the indeterminacy of these two 
processes was presented in Blair [19861.) 
“Words and Meanings” 
Philosophers have pondered the “meaning of meaning“ since at least 
the time of Aristotle, but perhaps no philosopher has had more impact on 
the philosophy of language than Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). 
Wittgenstein’s later work was instrumental in bringing about the “lin- 
guistic turn” in analytic philosophy during the 20th century. The “lin- 
guistic turn” resulted from the realization that philosophers who 
purported to study “ideas” were actually studying descriptions of ideas- 
not what we are thinking, but what we say we are thinking. The only 
direct access to ideas that we have is to our own ideas, by introspection. 
But we cannot easily generalize from our own introspection to statements 
about how others think (Hacker 1996b; Rorty, 1967). Wittgenstein (1953) 
reinforced this change in his later work, Philosophical Investigations, by 
arguing that many of the philosophical problems that puzzled philoso- 
phers were not problems at all, but were merely the result of misuses of 
language. As he put it so succinctly, “Philosophy is a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (Wittgenstein, 
1953, p. 47). It would be impossible, of course, to provide a complete dis- 
cussion of Wittgenstein’s extensive work in the philosophy of language 
here. His published works run to 13 volumes, and his Nachlass, or liter- 
ary estate, much of which is still not published, is even larger-more than 
30,000 pages (this is in the process of being published in 15 or more vol- 
umes as the Wiener Ausgabe [Nedo, 19931). The story of the complications 
and intrigues of this project are detailed in Toyton (1997). The complete 
electronic CD-ROM versions of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, published writ- 
ings, lectures, and letters, are each available from InteLex (http:/Aibrary. 
nlx.com/). The reader should also understand that Wittgenstein is not the 
only major philosopher of language; I will discuss some others here. Nor 
is it the case that every philosopher accepts Wittgenstein’s arguments 
without dispute. My purpose here is not to defend Wittgenstein, but to 
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present relevant portions of his work as clearly as possible because it 
has  been enormously influential in philosophical circles and in related 
areas of linguistics and psychology. An excellent overview of 20th cen- 
tury philosophy of language is provided by Lycan (2000). Blackburn 
(1984) provides an  introduction to the philosophy of language written 
specifically for the nonphilosopher. Devitt and Sterelny’s (1999) intro- 
duction to the philosophy of language includes a section on “language 
and mind” and a discussion of linguist Noam Chomsky’s work. Finally, 
many of the salient papers in the philosophy of language are collected 
in Rosenberg and Travis (1971). A more recent collection can be found 
in Ludlow (1997). 
The commentaries on Wittgenstein’s work are also extensive. The 
most detailed commentaries on Wittgenstein’s most influential work, 
Philosophical Investigations, are by the co-authors G. P. Baker and P. M. 
S. Hacker (the first two volumes are by Baker and Hacker [1980,1985], 
and volumes 3 and 4 are by Hacker alone [1990, 1996b1). Wittgenstein’s 
discussions on specific topics are frequently scattered throughout his 
writing, so Garth Hallet’s (1977) concordance to Philosophical 
Investigations can often be an extremely useful tool for locating and 
bringing together his writings on the same subject. Wittgenstein’s for- 
mer student and Cornell philosophy professor, Norman Malcolm, has 
put together several collections of his own insightful essays on 
Wittgenstein’s work. Of particular note is his Wittgensteinian Themes: 
Essays 1978-1989 (Malcolm, 1995). Even Wittgenstein’s personal life 
has a compelling interest because, for Wittgenstein, philosophy was not 
just a collection of puzzles, but a guide for living; a s  he once said, 
what is the use of studying philosophy if all that i t  does for 
you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some 
abstruse questions of logic, etc., if it does not improve your 
thinking about the important questions of everyday life? 
(Malcolm, 1972, p. 39) 
The two best biographical works are Norman Malcolm’s (1972) short 
but intimate Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, and Ray Monk‘s (1990) 
excellent, detailed biography Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. 
A third work, Theodore Redpaths (1990) Ludwig Wittgenstein: A 
Information Retrieval and the Philosophy of Language 11 
Student’s Memoir offers an undergraduate’s impressions of the philoso- 
pher. Several of Wittgenstein’s students have published literal tran- 
scriptions of his classroom lectures and discussions (Ambrose & 
Macdonald, 1979; Geach, Shah, & Jackson, 1989; King & Lee, 1978). 
Finally, Bouwsma published his notes of discussions that he had with 
Wittgenstein during the last few years of the philosopher’s life 
(Bouwsma, Wittgenstein, Craft, & Hustwit, 1986). 
An important characteristic of Wittgenstein’s work was his own self- 
criticism. Early in his career he was strongly influenced by the logic and 
analytical philosophy of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. After 
studying with Russell at Cambridge University, he wrote his first book, 
Dactatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein, 1961a, 1961b). This was 
the only philosophy book by Wittgenstein published during his lifetime; 
it lays out a rigorous, logical model of language and a “picture theory of 
meaning” that has clear antecedents in the work of Frege and Russell. 
Wittgenstein wrote most of the Dactatus while serving as a much- 
decorated soldier in the Austrian army during World War I. After 
writing the Ductatus, Wittgenstein felt that he had solved the major 
problems of analytic philosophy. But while he was away from academic 
life, his book was having a major impact on analytic philosophy in 
England, of course, but also within the newly formed Austrian move- 
ment in analytic philosophy, Moritz Schlick‘s “Der Wiener Kreis” (The 
Vienna Circle). Wittgenstein began to see that he had not solved all the 
problems of philosophy and that there were serious problems with some 
things he said in the Dactatus. He spent the remainder of his academic 
life a t  Cambridge University. Although Bertrand Russell strongly sup- 
ported his return to professional philosophy, Wittgenstein was soon to 
criticize and change much of his earlier philosophy that Russell had 
found so attractive. Wittgenstein’s (1953) reassessment of his early phi- 
losophy culminated in the collection of philosophical remarks called 
Philosophical Investigations. Although the Investigations was a product 
of Wittgenstein’s extensive editorial efforts over the last years of his life, 
it was not published until shortly after his death, and the questions it 
raised, of course, could not be answered by Wittgenstein himself. 
(Wittgenstein’s other books have been put together from selections of his 
unpublished writings by his former students after his death.) 
Wittgenstein has left us with two interpretations of his intellectual 
12 Annual Review of Information Science and Technology 
legacy: Philosophical Investigations is either an extensive critique of his 
earlier work in the Dactatus, or, as some commentators insist, the second 
of two largely separate philosophies. Which of these two views is correct 
will probably never be answered to everyone’s satisfaction, but the best 
attempts to put Wittgenstein’s early and late philosophy into perspective 
are Norman Malcolm’s (1986) Nothing Is Hidden: Wittgenstein’s Criticism 
of His Early Thought, and P. M. S. Hacker’s (1989) Insight and Illusion. 
Although Wittgenstein focused his philosophical efforts on many spe- 
cific themes, the published works themselves do not separate his writ- 
ings into categories: Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1978) 
contains many remarks on language as well as mathematics, 
Philosophical Investigations (1953) contains remarks on philosophy in 
addition to mathematics, logic, and psychology, and Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology (1980) contains remarks on language, psychol- 
ogy, and other subjects. Wittgenstein’s philosophy on a particular topic is, 
in some sense, everywhere in his writings, but not collected or summa- 
rized in any one place. Successive paragraphs in a given work may deal 
with a specific topic, but the topic is dropped in favor of another and 
picked up again, seemingly at  random, later in the work, or in another 
work. Certainly one of the reasons for this patchwork approach to phi- 
losophy is that Wittgenstein was continually grappling with very deep 
and elusive problems, problems that had defied systematic solution by 
the best analytical minds of the 20th century. So, many of his recorded 
comments were not solutions to these problems, but the remnants of an 
intellectual battle that he fought all his life (his published writings go 
right up to a few days before he died, when he succumbed to a long ill- 
ness). Those who are interested in specific aspects of Wittgenstein’s work 
and do not have the time to make a study of his extensive writings must 
rely on secondary sources to bring together his work on particular topics. 
Fortunately, there are some good works. For those interested in his late 
philosophy of language, the first 130 pages of Hanna Pitkin’s (1972) 
Wittgenstein and Justice is, in this author’s opinion, the single best intro- 
duction to this aspect of his work. Those interested in Wittgenstein’s 
thought concerning more specific topics such as the determinacy of 
sense, the rejection of private languages, the denial of psycho-physical 
parallelism, and the rejection of mind-body dualism, among others, 
would do well to consult Glock‘s (1996) A Wittgenstein Dictionary, which 
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contains short discussions on, and references for, many major and minor 
topics in Wittgenstein’s writings. Readers who would like to see 
Wittgenstein’s writings on the same topic, but in different works, 
brought together should consult Anthony Kenny’s (1994) The 
Wittgenstein Reader. 
Wittgenstein’s writings on the philosophy of language were extensive 
and closely linked to his views on the philosophy of mind. To him, lan- 
guage is not a product of thought, as most philosophers accepted; “lan- 
guage,” as he put it, “is . . . the vehicle of thought.” 
When I think in language, there aren’t “meanings” going 
through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought. (Wittgenstein, 1953, 
p. 107) 
Or, stated somewhat differently: 
Knowledge is not translated into words when it is expressed. 
The words are not a translation of something else that was 
there before they were. (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 32) 
The point Wittgenstein is making is not that all thought uses lan- 
guage as a medium, for we can surely “think about” music or visual 
images without reference to language at  all, but that when we use lan- 
guage we usually use it as a means for thinking, not as a product of 
thought or as an expression of something we “have in mind.” 
This “Copernican Reversal” in the way that thought and language 
had traditionally been seen to be related has important implications for 
information retrieval. The process of information retrieval is often seen 
as one in which the inquirer has something “in mind”-an “information 
need”-which he or she then translates into an actual search query, in 
the same way that people were thought to express in ordinary language 
what they already had “in mind.” But if Wittgenstein is right that our 
use of language is a form of thinking, then the “language” of retrieval- 
the search terms that are available to us and the ways in which they can 
be combined-are the “language” with which we think about, and 
thereby articulate, what information we want. In short, how we think 
about our information needs is strongly constrained by the retrieval 
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language that is available to us, and insofar as the language of retrieval 
is limited, so will be our thinking about what we want. The language of 
retrieval not only limits how we articulate what we want but can also 
constrain the very thought process in which we determine what we 
want. Presumably, we would like to  think that we mold our information 
retrieval systems to serve our need for finding information; but, if 
Wittgenstein is correct, then it may be the case that our information 
retrieval systems are molding us to think along their lines. If this is the 
case, then it may be extremely difficult to design radically different or 
improved retrieval systems, because we are virtually locked into the 
way of thinking about retrieval that is embodied by existing systems. 
Wittgenstein presented his own view of language in terms of a cri- 
tique of traditional, widely accepted views. In Philosophical Inuesti- 
gations he presents a theory of language based on the writings of the 
medieval philosopher St. Augustine. The Augustinian model of language 
is a simple referential model that, although old, has been remarkably 
persistent, existing in various forms even today. The Augustinian model 
of language sees linguistic meaning in the following way: 
1. Words name objects: the meaning ofa word is the object for 
2. Every word has a meaning. 
3. The meaning of a word is independent of context. 
4. Sentence meaning is composed of word meanings. 
which it stands. 
1. Words Name Objects 
If we consider examples of words such as “chair,” “apple,” and “pen- 
cil,” language does seem to work this way. But if we look at examples 
such as “rectitude,” %harisma,” and “the day after tomorrow,” it is 
harder to make the case that words name “objects.” Wittgenstein (1953, 
p. 174) gives us a hint of the complexity he sees in these kinds of state- 
ments when he asks rhetorically: 
A dog believes his master is at  the door. But can he also 
believe his master will come the day after to-morrow?~sicl- 
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And what can he not do here?-How do I do it?-How am I 
supposed to answer this? 
If “the day after tomorrow” were simply a phrase correlated with an 
object, or “meaning,” of some kind, it would be plausible that even a dog 
could understand it and could come to expect his master then. A dog, 
after all, can recognize other kmds of objects: balls, bones, food, leashes, 
cats, and other dogs, as well as more abstract objects such as friends and 
enemies, and characteristic situations like his master coming home 
soon, playing, or being frightened. Further, a dog can “expect” things to 
happen some short time in the future, such as getting fed. But can a dog 
expect his master “the day after tomorrow?” Wittgenstein does not 
answer his question explicitly, but it is clear from his writings that he 
does not believe that a dog can do this. For Wittgenstein, the “day after 
tomorrow” is not a phrase that has a meaning, although we sometimes 
speak of it this way; that is, there are circumstances in which we use the 
word “meaning” in this way (we can imagine someone who is learning 
English asking “What does the ‘day-after-tomorrow’ mean?”). According 
to Wittgenstein (1953, p. 201, if we really want to understand the “mean- 
ing” of the “day after tomorrow” we need to look at  its use: 
For a large class of cases-though not for all-in which we 
employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be explained thus: the 
meaning of a word is its use in the language. 
Consequently, to understand the “meaning” of the “day after tomor- 
row,” we need to be able to use it in the right circumstances, and to use 
it in the right circumstances we need experiences of distinguishing one 
day from another-“today,” “tomorrow,” “the day after tomorrow”-of 
observing the succession of one day following another, and of using days 
as units of time in a variety of activities. Further, these are not inde- 
pendent activities that can be separated from our daily lives and prac- 
tices. To use the “day after tomorrow” correctly is not just to know a 
dictionary definition, it is to be able to discern the appropriate circum- 
stances and activities in which it can be used, and this ability is further 
contingent on our ability to participate in a broad range of human activ- 
ities in which understanding the “day after tomorrow” is important. 
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Someone who speaks another language and is learning English asks me, 
“What does the ‘day after tomorrow, mean?“ He can get along with this 
simple question because he already speaks another language and is 
probably familiar with the kinds of activities in which such a phrase is 
used. A dog, however, doesn’t share with us the activities in which the 
“day after tomorrow” is important. Wittgenstein (1953, p. 223) brings 
this out more strikingly with one of his more enigmatic statements: 
If a lion could talk we could not understand him. 
The reason we could not understand the speaking lion is that we have 
no personal experience of the activities in which he is engaged. If we can 
come to understand the meaning of a word by looking at its use, then 
meaning is intimately linked to the activities and practices that we have 
in common with others. If we do not have any activities in common, then 
there is nothing that we can talk about. In Wittgenstein’s words, we 
have too few “forms of life” in common with the lion on which we could 
base a common language. For Wittgenstein: 
We don’t start from certain words, but from certain occasions 
or activities. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p. 3) 
Only in the stream of thought and life do words have mean- 
ing, (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 30) 
After considering these problems with the Augustinian model of lan- 
guage, we may try to draw some comfort from the fact that language 
appears to work according to Augustine’s model, at least in the cases 
where actual objects are referred to. But even here the relationship 
between language and “objects” is not simple. “Words” and “objects” 
recall the much-debated topic of “reference.” Frege was one of the first 
philosophers to discuss some of the complexities of reference, but these 
issues reach back at least to the third century B.C. and Eubulides’l‘para- 
dox of the masked man” (sometimes called “the paradox of the hood”). 
Suppose, said Eubulides, that you see a masked man. In reality, the 
masked man is your brother. But you cannot say that you saw your 
brother. Frege (1952) highlighted one of the important issues of refer- 
ence with his example of the “Morning Star” and the “Evening Star.” 
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Both the Morning Star and the Evening Star refer to the same celestial 
object, the planet Venus. Yet the descriptions “Morning Star” and 
“Evening Star” do not have precisely the same meaning for the simple 
reason that we cannot use them interchangeably in everyday discourse. 
That is, in ordinary usage we cannot say, in the morning, that we see the 
“Evening Star” and, in the evening, that we are looking at  the “Morning 
Star,” although neither statement is, technically, false. 
In Frege’s example we can at least tell what the speaker who refers 
to the “Morning Star” in the evening, or the “Evening Star” in the morn- 
ing actually means. But Bertrand Russell (1905, p. 485) gave us an 
example of a problem of reference where it is not a t  all clear what the 
speaker means. Consider the following two statements: 
“George the IV wished to know if Scott was the author of 
Waverley .” 
“Scott is the author of Wauerley.” 
Now if “Scott)’ and “the author of Waverley” refer to the same person, 
and the meaning of a word is completely explained by its reference, as 
Augustine claims, then we should be able to use “Scott” and “the author 
of Waverley” interchangeably. If we substitute “Scott)’ for “the author of 
Wauerley” in Russell’s first sentence, then we get: “George the IV wished 
to know if Scott was Scott.” Here, in contrast to Frege’s example, the 
substitution of “Scott” for “the author of Wauerley” leaves us with a sen- 
tence that Russell believed was clearly false and whose intended mean- 
ing would be impossible to discern. Russell (1905) went on to develop his 
Theory of Definite Descriptions, which was aimed at  uncovering the log- 
ical form (as opposed to the grammatical form) of statements that refer 
to a single individual, like “the author of Wauerley.” This was used to 
address some of the troublesome puzzles about definite descriptions, 
such as the substitutivity problem, above, and references to nonexistent 
things (e.g., “There is no place called Shangri-La”). Although such a level 
of detail is beyond the scope of this review, it still makes engaging read- 
ing. (The interested reader should consult chapter 2 of Lycan [20001 for 
a very readable presentation of Russell’s work on definite descriptions 
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and the subsequent debates that he engaged in, principally with 
Strawson [ 19501.) 
It is clear that even when a word or phrase has an obvious reference 
such as “Scott” and “the author of Wauerley” do, the sense, or “meaning” 
of that word or phrase is more than just its reference. In some cases 
when we refer to a particular person we may not mean the person at  all, 
but some salient aspect of the person. For example, Wittgenstein’s 
father, Karl, was once referred to as “the Andrew Carnegie of Austria.” 
By this, it was not meant that Karl looked like Carnegie, or had Scottish 
ancestry, but that he, like Carnegie, was a wealthy industrialist who 
patronized the arts. Finally, it is evident that many words, such as “rec- 
titude” and “unicorn” do not refer to objects at all, yet we still use them 
regularly and are understood when we do so. Meaning must be some- 
thing other than simple reference. 
Augustine’s model of language is a simple model and easy to compre- 
hend, but some subtle aspects of it are not obvious at first. In particular, 
Augustine’s description of how he learned to speak is important. In his 
words, he “...heard words repeatedly used ... [and] gradually learnt to 
understand what objects they signified . . .” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 2). 
This passage makes the point that we can hear and distinguish words 
before we understand them. That is, words can exist for us without 
meaning-as words we don’t understand. Further, because we can have 
words without meaning, it follows that “meaning” can exist indepen- 
dently of words-it appears to be something that can be added to words 
by a specific act such as looking them up in a dictionary. In some 
instances we can even have a “sense” or “meaning” without a word. We 
can see this sometimes when we compare words in two languages. For 
example, the Japanese have a word that means the point when a sound, 
such as the single stroke of a large bell, has diminished to a level where 
the listener cannot tell whether he can still hear it or not. In English, we 
don’t have a word or simple phrase for this “meaning.” Augustine’s view 
of language dichotomizes words and meaning and sets up a framework 
in which they can be considered separately, a framework that exists in 
various forms to this day, most prominently in the belief in the indepen- 
dence of syntax and meaning that was the cornerstone of Chomsky’s 
(1965) generative grammar. 
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This dichotomy between words and meaning forces us to deal with 
questions of meaning in a predictable, almost unavoidable, way. 
Specifically, when we can no longer maintain the claim that meaning 
equals some entity such as an “object,” we give up the “object” but we 
inevitably try to keep the framework in which the “meaning” of a word 
is an entity of some kind. We think of a word having a “meaning” in the 
same way that we think of people having biological parents. The child 
may not know who his parents are, but their existence at some time is 
beyond doubt. Wittgenstein, too, believed in the dichotomization of 
meaning and words or grammar early in his career. But it was one of his 
major contributions to  the philosophy of language to question this fun- 
damental dichotomy; in short, to resist the ‘‘compulsion’’ to separate 
words and meaning that the Augustinian model of language seems to 
force on us. 
The questions “What is length?,” “What is meaning?,” “What 
is the number one?“ etc., produce in us a mental cramp. We 
feel that we can’t point to anything in reply to them and yet 
ought to point to something. (We are up against one of the 
great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive 
makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.) 
(Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 1) 
Augustine’s model of language reinforced the basic dichotomy 
between words and meaning, leaving to subsequent philosophers the 
task of trying to get them back together again. The fact that many words 
and phrases obviously do not refer to objects, yet are nonetheless mean- 
ingful, compels us to look for another entity that “meaning” could be. 
John Locke was able to articulate an alternative theory of meaning that 
preserved Augustine’s separation of words and meaning but did not fall 
prey to its failures. For Locke (1690/1985, p. 114): 
Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for 
nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them. 
Locke’s linking of a word’s signification, or “meaning,” with an “idea” 
resolves the problem of words that do not refer to a physical object or 
type of object. We may not be able to link all words to objects, but it 
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seems evident to some theorists that when we know the meaning of the 
words “rectitude” or ”unicorn” we do have something “in mind.” It is then 
easy to take the next step and assume that what we have “in mind  is 
what the word means. This is the “mentalistic theory of meaning”-a 
semantic theory that has widespread appeal and is implicit in much 
information retrieval theory. 
Locke’s mentalistic theory of meaning has had a long history of sup- 
port, and various forms of it survive today. But, as appealing as mental- 
istic theories of meaning are, they suffer from a number of fatal 
problems. In the first place, if the meaning or sense of a word that I 
understand is an idea, then that idea, by definition, is something private 
to me. But if meaning is private, how do I teach you my idea of the mean- 
ing of a word, or learn the meaning of a word that you understand but I 
do not-after all, you cannot see what is in my mind. We do explain the 
meaning of words and phrases to each other, but is this explanation 
really a presentation of our ideas? If the explanation we give turns out 
to be wrong, what is the source of our error? Did we have the right idea, 
but explained it incorrectly, or was our original idea incorrect in the first 
place? There is no way to tell. Yet to teach or learn the meaning of a word 
or phrase requires clear criteria of correctness, something a purely men- 
talistic theory of meaning does not-and cannot-have. For Wittgen- 
stein, the criterion for whether you understand the meaning of a word is 
not whether you have the right idea, but whether you use it correctly in 
your day-to-day speech and writing. If I want to teach you the “meaning” 
of a word, I can give you examples of how it is used, or show you how it 
is used in the appropriate actual or hypothetical circumstances. The 
question of whether you have the “right idea” doesn’t come up in ordi- 
nary usage. Thus, if the criterion for correct understanding is correct 
usage, then ideas are not the foundation of our understanding-usage is. 
This is not to deny that some “mental phenomena” accompany our lan- 
guage use, it only means that, whatever those “mental phenomena” are, 
they are not required for teaching or learning a language; they are what 
epistemologists call “epiphenomena.” The problem in semantics is 
not what the definition of “meaning” is, the problem is the seeming 
dichotomy between words and meanings that encourages us to think 
of “meaning” as a separate entity-something that can be linked to 
words and examined apart from usage. This is an example of what 
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Wittgenstein (1958, p. 143) called a “disease of thinking.” A disease of 
thinking is a mistaken way of conceptualizing a problem that leads us 
unavoidably to the wrong conclusion. This is exactly what happens, 
Wittgenstein says, when we dichotomize our view of language by saying 
that “words have meanings.” As soon as we talk as if there are such 
things as L‘meaning”’ that are linked, somehow, to words, we quite liter- 
ally force ourselves to grant the independent existence of “meanings.” 
Once we do that, it is a forgone conclusion that we will find something 
that we will be able to call the “meaning” of a word. Wittgenstein does 
not discuss the notion of a “disease of thinking“ at  any length, but the 
philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1931, p. 1391, who admitted to being strongly 
influenced by Wittgenstein, wrote a classic paper in which he describes 
and discusses a number of different kinds of linguistic errors like this- 
what he aptly called “systematically misleading expressions.” Note, 
though, that asking for the “meaning“ of a particular word, is a quite 
ordinary and acceptable kind of request for speakers to make. 
Wittgenstein felt that it was acceptable for ordinary speakers to talk this 
way because they weren’t concerned about the ultimate status of “mean- 
ings.” The problem occurs when philosophers try to analyze this state- 
ment. For Wittgenstein, many of the “diseases of thinking” about 
language are only problems for philosophers, not for ordinary native 
speakers. 
But “meanings” are not separate things that can be examined as a 
geologist examines rock samples. Meanings are not “entities,” but rather 
are emergent phenomena arising from our day-to-day activities and prac- 
tices (Holland, 1998). They are not solely mental entities, conscious or 
unconscious, because they are usually contingent on the circumstances 
and context of their usage. But although Wittgenstein linked meaning 
and use, he did not intend for meaning to be interpreted solely as behav- 
ior, a common misunderstanding of his work. Meaning is not solely 
behavioral because it often has a mental component, otherwise we would 
not be able to distinguish between someone who lies but has the same 
statements and behavior as someone telling the truth. Wittgenstein 
(1953, p. 220) expressed his attitude toward meaning and use most 
clearly when he said, “Let the use of words teach you their meaning.” 
The philosopher Hilary Putnam (1988) identifies several other prob- 
lems with mentalism in his essay “Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can’t 
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Be Right.” Max Black (1968), a contemporary of Wittgenstein, presents 
an  argument for the rejection of mentalism in his The Labyrinth of 
Language. 
2. Every Word Has a Meaning 
Even if the “meaning” of a word is not an  object, there is still a ten- 
dency to think of the meaning of a word as a single thing, something that 
is the same in all applications. This is implicit in the notion that mean- 
ing is fixed by definitions, a view with which Wittgenstein explicitly dis- 
agrees. Again, if we think of tangible objects-chairs, cars, hammers, 
and the like-this view has a certain appeal. But on closer examination 
we can see that, even with common objects, there can be cases in which 
the definition or meaning is not a single thing. Those who think that  a 
chair is simply a chair, should go to a museum of contemporary art. 
Here, what an  artist may call a chair can vary widely from our accepted 
notion of what a “chair” is. But even in ordinary usage, what we might 
call a chair can deviate from our normal expectations. Achair has a func- 
tion, it is something to sit on. Such a function can give the status of 
“chair” to a lot of objects. For example, if we need to sit down, but there 
are no ordinary chairs available, we might use a low table or a box to sit 
on. In a functional sense, the low table or box becomes a chair for the 
period of time we use it for this purpose. What is important is that  the 
definition of even an  ordinary object like a chair is not fixed. The bound- 
ary between what is a chair and what is not a chair may be unclear, and 
may vary according to circumstances. In a like manner, we can view a 
hammer as a specific kind of tool with a characteristic shape and heft, 
but we can also view a hammer as something that can be used in certain 
ways. In the functional sense, a lot of things can be used as hammers: 
rocks, iron bars, even fists. 
The words “hammer” and “chair” can also be used metaphorically, or 
as figures of speech, such as  when the weatherman says that a storm 
“hammered Cape C o d  or when a reporter states that Senator X “chaired 
the Armed Services Committee.” These metaphorical or  figurative uses 
of these words stretch our notion of what they mean and where it is 
appropriate to use them. 
Some names of objects find a wide variety of applications. The word 
“head  is used to denote a particular anatomical feature of most animals, 
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but there are other related uses of “head that may be only distantly 
related to this anatomical feature: 
“He went to the head of the line.” 
“She’s the head of the executive board.” 
“The crisis quickly came to a head.” 
“They began the canoe trip a t  the head of the river.” 
“The outlaws wuz headin’ North, sherifl?” 
“The sailor’s punishment was to keep the head clean for the 
next two weeks.” 
Such examples do not exhaust the different uses of the word “head,” 
and this variability is typical of many other common words, such as 
“line” or “pitch.” Examples like these should dispel any notion that word 
meaning is precise or a single thing or can even be limited to  the vari- 
ous definitions listed in an unabridged dictionary. Hilary Putnam (1988) 
goes even further. In the first place, he says, meaning is “holistic.” By 
this he means that the meaning of a word is not fixed once and for all by 
a definition (as logical positivists insisted it had to be), but is contingent 
on how it is used in a wide variety of statements and circumstances. No 
single use is definitional. Further, the meaning remains “nonmon~tonic’~ 
or “defeasible”-it is always subject to  revision or change. For example, 
when I say that the word “bird” means, in part, feathered bipeds that 
can fly, I do not mean for my listeners to conclude that a bird with a bro- 
ken wing can fly, or that a newly hatched bird can fly. Nor do I mean that 
birds like penguins or ostriches can euer fly. It is also the case that there 
may be future unanticipated circumstances in which the birds will not 
be able to fly. For example, we might find that if a bird were taken into 
space aboard the space shuttle, it could not fly in weightless conditions. 
It is also possible that genetic engineering will produce flightless birds 
of a new type. 
Putnam (1988) goes on to show that even when we agree on the mean- 
ing, or usage, ofa particular word we still may not all have the same cri- 
teria for its use. Meaning, he proposes, is subject to a kind of “division of 
linguistic labor.” By Putnam’s account, even when we agree on the “mean- 
ing of a word” we may not be using identical criteria for its application. I 
may recognize an elm tree by the general size and shape of its serrated 
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leaf, while my friend may recognize elms just as reliably as I do by exam- 
ining the shape of the mature tree, the appearance of the bark, and the 
characteristics of the leaf buds. An expert botanist might be able to iden- 
tify an elm by the particular cell structure of the wood, which can be seen 
under a microscope. Putnam’s point is that the ability to use a word- 
here, “elmn-in the same way does not guarantee that the users possess 
the same criteria for the word‘s usage. Language, according to Putnam, 
is a cooperative activity. We may have useful heuristics that help us iden- 
tify things like elms, but no one, not even the expert, can identify things 
like elms in every possible circumstance. For example, a botanist would 
probably not be able to identify an elm in complete darkness, but a blind 
person may have touch sensitive enough to do so by handling the bark 
and leaves. To distinguish an elm from a tree that looks very similar to 
it, or to identify an elm in the winter when it has no leaves, we would 
probably rely on expert botanists or a tree identification guide. But if we 
know very little about elms, we may just rely on our neighbor to help us 
identify them. This is what Putnam means by the “division of linguistic 
labor.” The expert, according to Putnam, does not know a “more com- 
plete” definition of “elm” than we do, he or she simply knows more about 
elms than we do, and this additional information about elms may be use- 
ful for identifylng elms in certain circumstances. 
Wittgenstein (1953) would say that what accounts for the different cri- 
teria that we have, even when we can each identify elms reliably, is that 
we use the word “elm” in different “forms of life” and “language games.” 
Forms of life are the regular activities and practices we engage in on a 
day-to-day basis, and language games are the regular patterns of word 
usage that dictate how we employ language in these activities and prac- 
tices. Certain language games may be used primarily in specific forms of 
life. We need only the criteria to identify elms in the forms of life and lan- 
guage games that concern us. If we are not botanists, we may want only 
to identify the elms that we see in our own yard or neighborhood. The 
ability to distinguish species of elms, e.g., those that grow in southern lat- 
itudes from those that grow in northern latitudes, may not be important 
to us. For some botanists, distinguishing various species of elm may be 
important, but understanding the cell structure of elm wood may not be 
important. For a botanist a t  a tree farm, understanding the many vari- 
eties of cultivated elm species may be important, but understanding how 
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to identify elms in the wild may be unimportant. And a botany student 
studying for an exam may need only to be able to write down the scien- 
tific definition of an “elm,” which might include its Latin name and its 
correct phylum and genus. Some of these language games may pick out 
the same trees as elms, and some may not. There is no sense of a “com- 
plete” definition of an “elm” that would enable us to pick out elms in all 
conceivable circumstances because a single individual would probably 
not find himself or herself in “all conceivable circumstances.” It also 
should be clear that there is no single language game that would require 
such an all-inclusive understanding of what an elm is. The criterion for 
whether individuals know the meaning of a word like “elm” is not 
whether they command some arbitrarily “complete” definition of an elm, 
but whether they can use the word “elm” correctly in the activities and 
practices in which they wish to participate. 
3. The Meaning of a Word Is Independent of 
Context 
Indexicals are good examples of context-dependent words: words like 
“here,” %ow,” “this,” “that,” “him,” “her,” and “it.” The references for 
these words change from context to context. These examples are fairly 
obvious, but other examples are more subtle and deal with aspects of 
context beyond the notion of physical presence or absence. Wittgenstein 
(1969, p. 348) gives the example, “I am here.” This sentence has the 
indexicals “I” and “here,” and these would be clarified by ascertaining 
who spoke the sentence and on what occasion. But if, as Wittgenstein 
notes, you are sitting before me and are perfectly visible, and you utter, 
“I am here” you probably mean something else entirely than the simple 
statement describing where you are; that is, it is obvious to me that you 
are here, so you must be trying to tell me something else. One can imag- 
ine a situation in which one person is distraught over something. A 
close friend or relative approaches, touches his or her hand, and says, 
“Don’t worry, I am here,” meaning, of course, not just that the speaker 
is physically present, but that the speaker is emotionally supportive. In 
this utterance the context needed to interpret the meaning of the sen- 
tence extends beyond the simple notion of physical presence and 
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includes the relationship between the two individuals and the particu- 
lar circumstances in which they find themselves. 
Context can often indicate which of the many meanings of a word is 
currently being used. For example, the word “pitch” can mean a lot of 
things: the slope of a roof, the modulation of voice, a specific action in 
a baseball game, a tar-based substance, the description of a product 
that a salesman gives his customer, and so on. But if two individuals 
are talking while they attend a baseball game and use the word 
“pitch,” it is highly unlikely that it means anything other than a spe- 
cific action in the game. In fact, if the speaker a t  the baseball game 
were to  continually remind the listener that he or she was using the 
word “pitch” to refer to an action in the baseball game and not any of 
the other uses of “pitch,” such explanation would be considered 
bizarre, irritating, or even insulting. 
Sometimes the context of an utterance can be so strong that it com- 
pletely overrides the meaning of the actual words spoken. President 
Franklin Roosevelt would often dispel the boredom of a long receiving 
line before a White House dinner by saying completely inappropriate 
things to the guests as he greeted them-one of his favorite greetings was 
“I murdered my grandmother this morning.” The guests, of course, would 
not hear his exact words and would assume that the President had 
greeted them in a cordial and expected manner (Fadiman & Bernard, 
2000). Some individuals can even carry such a strong context with them 
that it becomes virtually impossible for them to say, or be understood to 
say, certain things. Could the Dalai Lama make an obscene gesture? 
Probably not, no matter what his intention actually was. 
4. The Meaning of a Sentence Is Composed of 
the Meanings of Its Words 
If we insist on understanding “meanings” as entities that are some- 
how attached to words, it can lead us into another problem; specifically, 
we may conclude that sentence meaning is somehow put together from 
the meanings of the words. If this is the case, then, most fundamentally, 
understanding the meaning of a sentence means that we must be aware 
of all the words in a sentence. Yet there is ample empirical evidence that, 
a t  least with speech, we often do not even hear every word in a sentence. 
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For example, suppose that you walk into a fast food restaurant and go 
up to the counter to order what you want. As you approach the counter, 
a clerk approaches you and says, “Kelp ya?” In  spite of the fact that the 
clerk, strictly speaking, has not said any English words, we generally 
understand him to have said, “Can I help you?”-a phrase that makes 
sense. In  cases like this, it is clear that we understand the situation or 
circumstances before we understand what is said to us, and our expec- 
tations about what is likely to be said may supersede what is actually 
said. Thus, sentence meaning, in this example, is not built up out of 
word meanings for the simple reason that we did not hear the words in 
the sentence. 
But what about cases where we do hear all the words in a sentence. 
Are there ever cases in which the meaning of a sentence seems to have 
nothing to do with the meanings of the individual words? Yes, there are. 
Consider the following example. I come into my office in the morning, 
and after greeting a colleague I ask her, “Is Bill back from vacation yet? 
She answers, in a perfectly forthright manner, “I saw a yellow 
Volkswagen in the parking lot this morning.” What did she mean? I t  is 
not difficult to determine that she is saying that she believes Bill is back 
from vacation-i.e., that Bill owns a yellow VW, that a yellow VW is 
uncommon enough that Bill probably has the only one, and if Bill is back 
from vacation he will have likely driven his car to the office and parked 
it where it can be seen by others. But no matter how extended and 
detailed the descriptions are of the meanings of “saw,” “yellow,” 
“Volkswagen,” “parking lot,” and so on, there is no way that we can 
derive the meaning my colleague intended only from the meanings of her 
words. To understand what is happening here, we must turn to the work 
of another philosopher of language, Paul Grice, who distinguished 
between sentence meaning and speaker meaning. 
The idea that words have meanings or definitions and that we come 
to understand what is said by somehow “looking up” the meanings of 
what we hear has been called the “Coding Theory of Language” (Eco, 
1976). In  short, words are codes that we must read or hear and then 
translate in order to arrive a t  their meaning. Sometimes language works 
this way, but, according to Grice, it is often the case that our under- 
standing of what is said or written is inferential. Specifically, when we 
listen to what is said to us we begin with a number of assumptions about 
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the intentions of the person to whom we are listening. Grice called these 
assumptions “conversational implicatures.” In  this example, when our 
colleague tells us “I saw a yellow Volkswagen in the parhng lot this 
morning,” she does not answer our question directly, and we must there- 
fore infer what she meant rather than take the literal meaning of what 
she said to be what she intended. But we can only do this if we make the 
initial assumption that she is honestly trying to answer our question. 
This is the “cooperation principle.” Whenever we talk to someone, we 
almost always assume they want to cooperate with us. But we make 
other assumptions too. Grice’s (1989, pp. 26-27) Principle of Cooperation 
is based on the satisfaction of nine maxims, which fall into four cate- 
gories: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner: 
There are two maxims of Quantity: 
1. Make your contribution as informative as is 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative 
required (for the current purposes of the exchange). 
than is required. 
Two maxims of Quality: 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate 
evidence. 
One maxim of Relation: 
1. Say only what you believe to be relevant. 
Four maxims of Manner: 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
4. Be orderly. 
I t  is my assumption, in this example, that  my colleague is answer- 
ing my question in a cooperative and relevant manner tha t  allows me 
to make the necessary inferences that  lead me to understand what 
she means. Without this assumption of cooperation, our communica- 
tion would be far more difficult, and everything we say would have to 
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be taken literally; that is, statements whose literal interpretation did 
not make sense would have to be considered odd, inappropriate, or 
meaningless. 
In information retrieval, the process of describing what we want and 
evaluating what we retrieve is a lot like a conversation. We make 
requests and the retrieval system “answers” with sets of retrieved docu- 
ments. Thus, we would expect that for successful “communication” to 
take place, Grice’s maxims must be upheld in the search process. It is 
here that we can get the clearest picture of the difference between using 
a search engine to find information and asking an experienced searcher, 
such as a librarian, to help us. For both a search using a search engine 
and a search in which we ask a professional searcher to help us, we will 
probably assume, as Grice asserts, that both will be cooperative-they 
will try to answer our request. The difference between the two situations 
becomes clearer when the initial search fails to produce useful informa- 
tion. With the professional searcher, we can explain which of Grice’s 
maxims has been violated in the search, and thereby provide guidance 
to the searcher on how to revise the search. For example, if we don’t get 
enough information (a violation of the first maxim of Quantity) we might 
say, “That’s what I’m looking for, but I need more of the same kind of 
information.” If we get too much information (a violation of the second 
maxim of Quantity), we might say, “That’s way too much detail, can you 
get me a more concise summary?” In another situation, we might receive 
information that is on the desired topic, but of questionable veracity (a 
violation of the first maxim of Quality), so we might say, “The informa- 
tion you got me claims that event X actually occurred, but can you find 
any documentation that substantiates that claim?” We could give exam- 
ples for the violation of Grice’s other maxims, too. The only kinds of 
retrieval failure that have been discussed much in the information 
retrieval literature have been the retrieval of nonrelevant documents (a 
violation of the maxim of Relation) and the retrieval of too much infor- 
mation (a violation of the second maxim of Quantity). It might be useful 
to consider the other maxims as additional criteria for successful 
retrieval (Blair, 1992). 
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Externalism and the Philosophy of 
language 
Recent work in the philosophy of language has shown the influence of 
the trend toward “Externalism” in the philosophy of mind. (A good pre- 
sentation of the various forms of Externalism can be found in McGinn, 
1989. See also McCulloch, 1995, and Rowlands, 1999.) Traditionally, the 
philosophy of mind has been almost exclusively “interna1ist”-that is, 
the workings of the mind, our thought processes, have been seen as act- 
ing entirely within the physical boundaries of the brain and skull. 
Internalism has been an implicit but essential component of the 
mind-body dualism most strongly associated with Descartes, and is still, 
in various forms, fundamental to many current models of cognition. 
Externalism, on the other hand, does not place the boundaries of cogni- 
tion within the skull, but argues that there are many external facilities 
or processes that are necessary for cognition. Wittgenstein, who can be 
said to have had Externalist leanings, gave the example of our using a 
pencil and paper when we perform calculations. Many of us need such 
external implements for even simple calculations, but all of us need 
them for complex calculations. If we do not have a paper and pencil 
handy, we, quite literally, cannot think-the pencil and paper become a 
sine qua non for thought itself. Today, we have many such tools essential 
for thought: computers, databases, graphical plotters, and so on. None of 
us remembers everything he or she needs t o  conduct our daily affairs. 
Books, databases, and personal computers become necessary extensions 
of our memories. Without these implements, we would not be able to 
think the way we do. 
The beginnings of Externalism, as a distinct movement in the philos- 
ophy of mind, finds its roots in Putnam’s (1975) “Twin Earth” thought 
experiment. Putnam asked us to imagine that there was a “Twin E a r t h  
that was exactly like our own earth, even to the point of having a “twin” 
of every person on this earth. But there was one aspect of Twin Earth 
that was different: On Twin Earth they had a substance they called 
“water,” which was exactly like our own water except that instead of hav- 
ing a chemical structure H,O it had a different structure that Putnam 
called “XYZ.” Except for the different chemical structure, Twin Earth 
water had exactly the same function there as it does here: Twin Earthers 
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drank it, washed in it, poured it on their plants, and used it in squirt 
guns for amusement. Twin Earth “water” came out of the sky in the form 
of rain, and large amounts of it formed rivers, lakes, and oceans, just like 
ours does. Since the Twin Earthers’ use of their “water” was exactly like 
our own use of water, their conception of water-that is, their idea of 
what it was and how it was used-was exactly the same as our own idea 
of what we called “water.” In other words, what average Twin Earthers 
had “in their heads” about water was exactly the same as what we had 
in our heads about our version of water. Yet, Putnam wrote, Twin Earth 
water was different from our water because it had a different chemical 
structure ( X Y Z  vs. H,O). The ineluctable conclusion of this thought 
experiment is that semantic meaning is not entirely internal. At least 
part of the definition of what water is, is external to our skulls because 
what we and the Twin Earthers have in our heads cannot distinguish 
our water from Twin Earth water. As Putnam (1975, pp. 144) put it, “Cut 
the pie any way you like, ‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head!” Tyler Burge 
(1979) published an article a few years later extending Putnam’s exter- 
nalist interpretation of semantics to include intentional mental states 
such as beliefs, desires, hopes, and fears. Burge called the internalist 
interpretation that he and Putnam criticized “individualism.” 
Although the Twin Earth thought experiment is entirely fanciful, 
similar phenomena occur every day. In most categories there is a level of 
generality where different people will call different things by the same 
name-for example, what I call a “sparrow” and another person calls a 
“sparrow” might actually be different species of birds, even though they 
have the same behavior, general appearance, and habitat. The Twin 
Earth thought experiment has had a profound effect on philosophy over 
the last three decades. As Pessin and Goldberg (1996, p. xi) observed, 
“Twin Earth and ‘The Meaning of Meaning,’ the article in which it 
became famous, comprise perhaps the most influential single philosoph- 
ical episode in the past half century.” This quotation was taken from the 
preface of their valuable 20-year retrospective collection of prominent 
articles written about Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment. 
Externalist theories of cognition have been appearing in areas out- 
side of philosophy, too. Andy Clark (19971, a neuroscientist/philosopher, 
has extended it to  cognitive science with what he calls “scaffolding.” 
Scaffolding is the process in which people intentionally alter their 
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environment in ways that will elicit the kinds of responses that they 
want. Scaffolding provides external augmentation for intelligent activ- 
ity, enabling us to achieve outcomes that would be difficult or impossi- 
ble for a single, unassisted individual. This external assistance can be 
physical (e.g., a hammer, a truck, a boat, databases), cognitive (e.g., 
books, methods of estimation, rules of thumb, explicit directions), or 
social (e.g., creating professional societies or guilds of craftsmen to 
establish professional standards, to facilitate the dissemination of 
information, and to monitor professional conduct). Scaffolding con- 
trasts most specifically with the Internalist foundation for intelligent 
behavior-“mental models.” For some Externalists, mental models are 
not the foundation of understanding at  all. As they put it, we don’t 
need internal representations of the world, that is, mental models, 
because “the world is its own best representation” (Clark, 1997, p. 46). 
Clark traces the roots of the idea of scaffolding back to the Soviet psy- 
chologist Lev Vygotsky (1986). As Clark (1997, p. 45) describes it: 
“Vygotsky stressed the way in which experience with external structures 
(including linguistic ones, such a words and sentences ...I might alter 
and inform an individual’s intrinsic modes of processing and under- 
standing.” The more general notion of “mind as inextricably interwoven 
with body, world, and action” (Clark, 1997, p. xvii) has its antecedents in 
the works of philosophers Martin Heidegger (1961) and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1963). This ability to alter our immediate envi- 
ronment in order to augment our abilities and stimulate specific actions 
gives us the capability to perform exceptionally complex tasks, from 
building a house, to constructing a dam, to designing the equipment that 
can take astronauts to the moon and return them safely to Earth. 
Scaffolding occurs even on a simple level when we make subtle changes 
in our environment, for example, to help us remember things; that is, we 
can put an overdue library book on the driver’s seat of the car so that 
when we get into the car next we will see the book and be reminded to 
return it. Or, we can leave notes to ourselves stuck to prominent places, 
like the refrigerator, to remind us of things we need to do. 
Some of the most interesting scaffolding is that which we erect to 
enable several individuals to work together to perform a complex task. 
An exceptionally rich and detailed example of this kind of deliberate 
scaffolding occurs in Hutchins’ (1995) Cognition in the Wild, in which the 
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author describes a long and detailed study of the process of navigation 
on a Navy ship. This example is interesting because it involves the col- 
laboration of several individuals, each of whom brings a different kind 
of expertise to the activity, and it requires a kind of precision and low 
fault tolerance that puts significant pressure on the individuals 
involved to get all the procedures right. As Clark (1997, p. 214), talking 
about Hutchins’ work, put it, “Ship navigation emerges from the well- 
orchestrated adaptation of an extended complex system comprising 
individuals, instruments, and practices.” 
Seaff old ing and Information Retrieval 
If scaffolding can be considered an often necessary part of our cogni- 
tive processes, then it takes no great exercise of insight to see that infor- 
mation retrieval systems can be part of the scaffolding for many of our 
intelligent activities. An information retrieval system is, most obviously, 
a kind of external memory that can greatly augment what we remember, 
allowing us to consider and compare much more information than we 
could keep in our heads. But, more subtly, it can influence how we think 
as well. The particular searching procedures and the explicit or implicit 
theory of representation used by an information retrieval system can, 
quite literally, become extensions of the cognitive processes of inquir- 
ers-this can be either good or bad. For example, a simple full-text doc- 
ument retrieval system works by having searchers specify the words and 
phrases that they believe will occur in the literal text of the documents 
that have the intellectual content they would find useful, but would not 
occur in the text of documents they would not find useful. It has been 
shown, though, that on a reasonably large system, searchers looking for 
documents with a particular intellectual content are not very good at 
predicting the words and phrases that would occur in the documents 
they want, but would not occur in similar documents that they would not 
want (Blair & Maron, 1985). A simple full-text retrieval system, as scaf- 
folding, extends the cognitive processes of the searcher, but it does so in 
an unnatural way, forcing the searcher to predict the exact words and 
phrases that occur in the desired documents, but do not occur in unde- 
sirable documents-something that people don’t do well on a reasonably 
large system. Because information retrieval systems are potentially part 
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of the scaffolding of inquirers, and, thus, are extensions of their cogni- 
tive processes, it becomes important that the systems provide a good fit 
between what they do and what people are good at. In the example just 
discussed (Blair & Maron, 1985), the searchers were lawyers trying to 
find evidence that supported the defense of a large corporate lawsuit. 
Full-text retrieval was not a good extension of the lawyers’ thought 
processes in this case because it is hard to predict the exact words and 
phrases that can be used to discuss a particular topic. But one could 
imagine situations where full-text retrieval would be a good extension of 
our cognitive processes: perhaps a system providing access to newspaper 
articles where most of the searches are for articles discussing specific 
individuals, companies, institutions, cities or countries, or within cer- 
tain time frames. People are quite good a t  remembering proper names 
and approximate time frames. An article discussing Henry Kissinger’s 
1972 talks with Andrei Gromyko on East Berlin will, almost certainly, 
have each of these names and the date in the article, and articles that  
do not discuss this event will almost certainly not have all of these 
names in the literal text. Here, a full-text information retrieval system 
will extend the cognitive capacities of the searchers in ways that take 
advantage of how they think; that is, it facilitates, or even improves, 
their thinking. Naturally, information retrieval systems should augment 
what we don’t do well, too, such as having literal recall of gigabytes of 
written text or images. 
If IR systems can be like extensions of our thought processes, then we 
must take heed of the way that memory works. Human memory is not a 
faculty in which everything perceived is deposited literally and kept. 
Psychologists have shown that we are quite selective about what we 
remember, and time has a natural way of weeding out memories that are 
less important or less useful to us. In other words, forgetting may be just 
as important as remembering. “The Russian neuropsychologist 
Alexander Luria described a much-celebrated mnemonist, Shere- 
shevskii, who . . . was overwhelmed by detailed but useless recollections 
of trivial information and events. He could recount without error long 
lists of names, numbers, and just about anything else that Luria pre- 
sented to him. . . . Yet when he read a story or listened to other people, he 
recalled endless details without understanding much of what he read or 
heard . . . he had great difficulty grasping abstract concepts” (Schacter, 
Information Retrieval and the Philosophy of Language 35 
1996 referring to Luria, 1968, p. 81). The literal, nonforgetting memory 
of Luria’s mnemonist is probably a close analogy to the way that com- 
puter “memory” works, and the difficulties Shereshevskii had with total 
recall are certainly a caveat of sorts. Thus, if the ranking of memories by 
their importance and the forgetting of useless ones are significant 
processes in human recollection, then IR systems, if they are to be ade- 
quate scaffolding for intelligent activities, may need to have similar 
characteristics-records should be continually ranked by their impor- 
tance and less important ones regularly weeded out and forgotten. IR 
systems do not always have to mimic the way human memory works, 
but they should complement its functionality. Sometimes this may mean 
doing things essentially the same way, but sometimes it may mean doing 
things very differently. This is one of the main points made by Winograd 
and Flores (1987). 
The only article in the information science literature to make explicit 
use of Clark‘s work on scaffolding is Jacob’s (2001). In  this article, Jacob 
relates classification theory to the “everyday world of work,” a context 
that  is strongly reliant on scaffolding. Scaffolding theory will undoubt- 
edly have an  important impact on description and classification in infor- 
mation retrieval, so it is likely that  there will be more publications 
utilizing it in the future. 
Implications of the Philosophy of 
language for Information Retrieval 
The general features of the philosophy of language’s theory of mean- 
ing that I have presented here can be summarized as follows: 
1. “Meanings” are not linked to words (Wittgenstein). 
2. “Meanings” are not concepts or any other single thing 
(Wittgenstein, Putnam). 
3. To understand the meaning of a word is not to have some 
definition in your head, but to be able to use the word cor- 
rectly in the activities and practices in which it is nor- 
mally used (Wittgenstein). To understand a word means 
to know when to use it-which activities and practices 
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(Wittgenstein’s “forms of life”) it is relevant in-and how 
to use it (Wittgenstein’s “language games”). 
4. “Let the use of words teach you their meaning” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 220). Meaning is not the same as 
use, but emerges through use. 
5 .  Context is important for language. We often understand 
the situation in which language is used before we under- 
stand the words used (Wittgenstein). Meaning, in part, is 
an external notion-what we have in our heads, our ideas, 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for determining what 
we mean: Context and circumstances are often essential 
determinants of meaning (Putnam, Wittgenstein). 
6. We make a variety of assumptions about the intentions of 
those with whom we talk. In particular, unless given evi- 
dence to the contrary, we assume that the individuals 
with whom we talk will cooperate with us and follow 
Grice’s maxims. 
Although I have presented the principal themes of several prominent 
philosophies of language here, the reader should keep a number of 
caveats in mind. First of all, these are not the only issues engaged by 
philosophers of language. The literature of the philosophy of language is 
both deep and extensive, ranging far beyond the intellectual boundaries 
of the issues presented here. Secondly, the philosophical conclusions pre- 
sented here are by no means accepted by all philosophers. Philosophy of 
language, like most other active intellectual processes, remains very 
much a dialectic. Nevertheless, the philosophies presented here are 
prominent, and have established themselves as major landmarks in the 
intellectual landscape of the philosophy of language. 
The Significance of the Philosophy of 
language for Information Retrieval 
Because the thesis of this discussion is that the philosophy of lan- 
guage has some significance for the problem of description in informa- 
tion retrieval, I will briefly sketch some of this significance. 
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1. If the contexts of activities and practices are important for under- 
standing language, it stands to reason that activities and practices 
are important for understanding document descriptions, too. As a 
consequence, it is essential for information retrieval systems to be 
as close as possible to the activities and practices that they serve. 
As Wittgenstein (1953, p. 220) said, we need to “let the use of words 
teach [us] the meaning.” If we want to know what the descriptions 
used to represent a document mean, we must examine how these 
descriptions are used in the activities and practices that use that 
information-how do people ask for this information and how do 
they talk about it? One of the consequences of computerizing infor- 
mation retrieval systems is that the information they contain is 
often separated from these relevant activities and practices. Paper- 
based information has some obvious disadvantages regarding stor- 
age and copying when compared to the same information in 
electronic form. But paper-based information has one distinct 
advantage over electronic information: Because a paper document 
does not need delicate electronic equipment to present it, it can be 
carried and used almost anywhere-from the office, to the home, to 
a bus, to a rainy construction site, and so on. It is also easy to mark 
up, annotate, or highlight, and parts of it can be clipped out or pho- 
tocopied and distributed. Further, small accidents such as dropping 
the information or spilling coffee on it do not render paper unread- 
able, although information on a laptop could not stand such abuse. 
Consequently, paper-based information can remain close to the 
activities that produce or use it, and these activities can provide an 
interpretive context for that information. But when that informa- 
tion is computerized, the very act of computerization may have the 
effect of removing the information from the activity context that 
provides much of its meaning and interpretation. The importance 
of the proximity of information systems to the activities and prac- 
tices they serve was a major concern of Blair (1990). 
2. If information retrieval systems cannot be physically near the 
activities and practices they support, then it may be useful to bring 
some of this context into the descriptions of the documents them- 
selves. This enhancement could be done by linking documents to 
the respective activities and practices in which they might be used, 
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and weeding out information germane to activities that have con- 
cluded. The first step in information retrieval system design, then, 
is to develop a detailed taxonomy of the various activities and prac- 
tices that produce or use the information on the system. Each doc- 
ument on the system must then be explicitly linked to one or more 
of these activities or practices. For private industry, documents 
could be linked specifically to the value-creating activities and the 
core competencies of the firm (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
3. If information retrieval can be seen as a kind of conversation 
between the searchers and those who designed the system or rep- 
resented the documents, then the quality of retrieval is in some 
sense related to the quality of this conversation. But one of the 
characteristics of conversation is that the conversing parties are 
able to respond immediately to each other’s expressions. This 
immediate conversational feedback minimizes the number of mis- 
understandings that can occur, by allowing the conversationalists 
to clarify any confusions or ambiguities of meaning that might 
arise. But one of the principal characteristics of information 
retrieval systems, especially computer-based ones, is that they 
inevitably create a distance between the conversationalists- 
searchers and system designerslindexers-that prevents them 
from getting the immediate feedback so characteristic of normal 
conversation (Blair, 1990). Linguistic meaning emerges through 
the interaction of individuals trying to make themselves under- 
stood as they conduct their daily affairs. But because no immediate 
feedback or chance at clarification takes place for searchers using 
an information retrieval system, the local interactions from which 
meanings emerge just don’t occur. Looking at the information 
retrieval process as a conversation helps to clarify the role of the 
professional searcher in the search process. The professional 
searcher (for example, a librarian) must assume, primarily, the role 
of an interpreter. He or she must interpret or explain the intended 
meaning of the document descriptions to the searcher, and help the 
searcher express information needs in ways that, when used as 
queries, will retrieve any useful documents that are available on 
the system. 
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The unnatural conversations between searchers and systems 
designerslindexers point to important avenues of research and sys- 
tem design. First and foremost, system designers should look into 
designing information retrieval systems that afford the opportu- 
nity for searchers and systems designerslindexers to converse in a 
more real-time mode. For systems in which this is impossible, it 
would be useful to develop procedures that use searcher feedback 
to adapt document descriptions. User feedback has been an area of 
IR research for decades, but no major commercial systems use 
these techniques, and, although considerable research into adap- 
tive systems has been conducted, no real consensus has emerged 
about which techniques are the best or even which techniques are 
better than others. (For early work in adaptive information 
retrieval see Salton [1989]. Some of the most interesting work on 
adaptation uses genetic algorithms. An excellent discussion of its 
importance in IR can be found in Serich [19991.) 
4. Because much of our intelligent activity is heavily scaffolded, it 
stands to reason that information retrieval systems may often be 
an integral part of that scaffolding. For scaffolding to work well, 
though, it must supplement, support, or extend our actual cogni- 
tive processes. In other words, information retrieval systems must 
be designed, at least in part, to work with some specific cognitive 
ability or process that is endemic to humans and is essential to our 
ability to search for information. The information retrieval problem 
will probably not be addressed satisfactorily if it is seen as a purely 
technical problem-that is, if the retrieval problem is addressed by 
simply taking advantage of specific technical resources or efficien- 
cies, such as storage capacity or physical access rates. The danger 
here is that by designing systems that take advantage of certain 
technical resources or efficiencies, we may actually force searchers 
to act in unnatural or problematic ways (see our example of using 
simple full-text retrieval to make fine discriminations of intellec- 
tual content in large systems [Blair & Maron, 19851). 
5. Finally, it is becoming increasingly important to understand how 
the growth in the size of information retrieval systems affects the 
prospects for designing effective systems. This situation is not a 
direct consequence of the philosophy of language, but arose in my 
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initial discussion of the ways in which document descriptions can 
fail. Because it is cheaper to keep all electronic documents than to 
regularly weed out those that are no longer useful, most computer- 
based information retrieval systems will continue to become larger. 
This increase in size will alter the way that documents and search 
requests are represented, changing the primary strategy of docu- 
ment representation from description to discrimination. But theo- 
ries of document representation are primarily oriented toward 
description and rarely take into consideration how well index terms 
discriminate. Most existing automatic indexing procedures used by 
commercial systems operate solely within the textual boundaries of 
the document they are indexing and make no allowances for how 
discriminating the assigned index terms are for actual searches on 
a particular system. The notion of “term discrimination” considered 
here is not just a comparison of term frequency occurrences, in 
which a term that occurs in just one document in the collection is 
considered a good discriminator and a term that appears in all the 
documents is not. What I mean by a good discriminator is a term 
that discriminates useful from useless documents for a typical 
searcher. So term discrimination, the way that I mean it, must take 
into consideration the searching characteristics, techniques, and 
judgments of the typical searcher using the system in addition to 
the frequency of occurrence of the term. For example, if you are 
looking only at  term frequency as a basis for discrimination, then 
identifylng each document in a collection by a unique accession 
number is an excellent discriminator. But from the searcher’s point 
of view, the unique accession number by itself would not be a very 
useful discriminator because there may be no simple way to relate 
it to what the searcher would find useful. 
As information retrieval systems grow larger, the pressure to dis- 
criminate useful from useless documents will become greater and the 
ability to discriminate will most likely get worse; mutatis mutandis, it is 
easier to discriminate, that is, to find, two useful documents among 10 
useless ones, than it is to discriminate or find two useful documents 
among 1,000 useless ones. Thus, as document retrieval systems become 
larger, retrieval effectiveness will generally get worse (or retrieval effort 
for the same level of effectiveness will get greater, which amounts to the 
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same thing). Part of this problem can be mitigated by setting up rigor- 
ous document retention policies and other procedures for weeding out 
useless documents from existing systems. But some systems, such as the 
World Wide Web, will grow without any upper bound, so the exclusion of 
useless Web sites, even if it could be done systematically, would proba- 
bly not be enough to mitigate the problems brought on by the growth in 
the overall number of Web sites. But for those systems for which peri- 
odic document weeding would be useful, the criteria for removing docu- 
ments may be purely pragmatic: Documents should be weeded out of a 
system when the activities to which they are relevant have concluded. 
There is a semantic lesson here, although it is a subtle one. One of the 
most important claims that Wittgenstein made in his philosophy of lan- 
guage was that questions of meaning in language cannot be adjudicated 
by appealing to abstract principles of semantics or to dictionary defini- 
tions, but can be resolved only by appealing to the ordinary usage of lan- 
guage. In short, whatever meaning there is in language, it is a meaning 
that emerges only from the day-to-day interactive usage of language- 
there can be no “better” or “more accurate” meaning in language than 
the meaning of ordinary discourse (this is why Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
of language is called “ordinary language philosophy”). If the final crite- 
rion for semantics is everyday usage, then we can see very quickly that 
information retrieval systems are forcing us to use language in an 
unnatural way. Specifically, our language was never intended to be used 
to discriminate the intellectual content of small numbers of documents 
from vast numbers of other documents with similar intellectual content. 
In our typical day-to-day interactions we simply don’t make such fine 
distinctions. 
In the majority of information retrieval situations, as has been 
shown, the strategy for representing intellectual content is oriented 
almost exclusively toward the description of content rather than the dis- 
crimination of content. In one kind of information retrieval, however, 
discrimination is taken into account in the representation of intellectual 
content-cases in which the retrieval of information is a prominent part 
of an established practice. Good examples include some of the scientific 
disciplines, particularly the natural sciences. Here, the development of 
a taxonomy, which both describes and discriminates the major topics 
within the practice, is an important part of the practice itself. Biologists 
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expend a significant amount of time discussing and even arguing about 
how the plants, animals, and professional activities of their respective 
fields are to be represented-that is, how they are to be described and 
discriminated from other, often similar, elements in their field. In fact, 
the theory behind the development of taxonomies in the life sciences has 
become a field of study in itself. As document collections grow to 
unprecedented sizes, perhaps we will need to take a lesson from the tax- 
onomical efforts of the natural sciences and find ways to develop tax- 
onomies of the more mundane information that we deal with on a daily 
basis. To expect that there will be a simple technical solution to this 
problem-the development of a particularly fast search engine, for 
example-is to  ignore the complexity of language to which the field of 
the philosophy of language is a testament. 
Writings on the Philosophy of 
language and IR 
Although the relevance of the philosophy of language to information 
retrieval is significant, its actual direct impact on the IR literature has 
been modest. Some of this may be due to the difficulty of the philosophy 
literature, but it is also the case that the philosophy of language is pri- 
marily concerned with puzzles of its own-puzzles such as the bound- 
aries of factual discourse or the supervenience of psychological states on 
brain states-which are of less obvious value for understanding the 
problems of document representation and retrieval. Consequently, the 
reader interested in information retrieval problems might have to read 
a fairly large body of writings before he or she could distill something 
useful from it. It is to be hoped that this discussion will have provided 
the reader with some useful entrees to that literature. Nonetheless, a 
few authors interested in the problems of information retrieval have 
found the philosophy of language useful. Frohmann (1990) utilized the 
philosophy of language’s critique of mentalism to point out similar short- 
comings in the mentalism of indexing theory. In the same year, Blair 
(1990) published Language and Representation in Information Retrieual, 
in which he presented an extended argument for the importance of the 
problem of representation in information retrieval and for the relevance 
of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language for understanding it better. Two 
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years later, Blair (1992) published a paper in which he gave a brief 
overview of the relevance of the linguistic philosophies of Austin, Searle, 
Grice, and Wittgenstein to the problems of information retrieval. In 
1998, Hjorland published a paper in which he used the early and late 
philosophies of Wittgenstein as frameworks through which to examine 
some of the issues of information retrieval. In particular, he contrasts 
the early and late theories of meaning articulated by Wittgenstein in his 
“picture theory of meaning” and his “language games.” Blair and 
Kimbrough (2002) have applied Wittgenstein’s notion of “perspicuous 
examples” (“ijbersichtliche Darstellungen”) to the description of docu- 
ments. They propose that in many document collections there are what 
they call “exemplary documents,” which provide a guide to the intellec- 
tual content of many of the documents. Finally, there is an indirect link 
between an article on “relevance” by Harter (1992) and Grice’s philoso- 
phy of language. Harter discusses the notion of relevance as presented 
by Sperber and Wilson (1986) who, in turn, base much of their work on 
Grice’s philosophy of language. 
One branch of the philosophy of language that has had a clear influ- 
ence on information system design in general and, to a lesser extent, 
information retrieval has been the theory of Illocutionary, or Speech, 
Acts: Austin (1962) called them “Illocutionary Acts,” while Searle (1969) 
gave them their more common name, “Speech Acts.” Their biggest 
impact has been on electronic messaging systems (Kimbrough, 1990; 
Kimbrough & Lee 1986; Winograd & Flores, 19871, but Blair (1990, 
1992) has described how they could be applied to information retrieval. 
The essence of Illocutionary, or Speech, Acts is that a class of linguistic 
events (Speech Acts) exists that has predictable structures and 
processes. I can say: 
1. I’ll mail you the check tomorrow. 
2. I christen this ship the “Norton Sound, AVM-1.” 
3. Pick me up outside the main gate after the game. 
4. Mary is the best copyeditor we have. 
When we say such things (make a promise, christen a ship, give an 
order, or make an evaluation), we aren’t so much talking about some- 
thing, or making an assertion, we are actually doing something with our 
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statements. If a reasonable individual in a normal situation promises to 
do something, then, by virtue of that statement, he or she has made a 
promise. What makes a Speech Act work is a set of “felicity conditions” 
that must be satisfied. Felicity conditions are ordinary circumstances or 
conventions that each Speech Act presupposes. I can promise you that I 
will lend you my car, if I have a car. But I cannot promise to  make you a 
member of the House of Lords, because I am not the ruling British 
Monarch. Searle (1969) identifies the following kinds of Speech Acts: 
Directives: In which we order others to do things (e.g., “Get 
Commissives: In which we promise to do something (e.g., 
Declarations: In which we bring about changes in the world 
solely by our utterance-in short, “Saying makes it SO” (e.g., 
“I now pronounce you husband and wife.”) 
Expressives: In which we express our personal feelings and 
attitudes (e.g., ‘You did a terrific job!”) 
Assertives: In which we make statements, truly or falsely, 
about how things are (e.g., “The Sears Tower is the tallest 
building in Chicago.”) 
me a Guinness Stout and a bag of chips.”) 
“I’ll return the book I borrowed tomorrow.”) 
Each of these acts has a predictable structure and felicity conditions 
that guarantee its success. The best known applications of Speech Acts 
to electronic messaging is the COORDINATOR system (Flores, Graves, 
Hartfield, & Winograd, 1988; Winograd, 1988; Winograd & Flores, 
1987). In this system, if you send a message making a promise to some- 
one, the COORDINATOR system will prompt you in the future to fulfill 
your promise (the COORDINATOR cannot tell whether you have made 
a promise, given an order, or made a declaration; nor can it ascertain 
whether all the felicity conditions have been satisfied-this information 
must be provided by the individual sending the message). The idea that 
a number of messages can be related as parts of the same transaction is 
an important consequence of Speech Act analysis. 
Blair (1990,1992) has suggested using the different Speech Acts as a 
way of categorizing messages on an information retrieval system. This 
would provide another kind of access for retrieving documents. Such a 
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classification system is especially useful for business communication in 
which the type of document-promise, order, declaration, and so on- 
can be important in many business processes (e.g., a “promise” in a busi- 
ness context might be a contract, whereas a statement of corporate 
strategy might be a kind of directive). 
Finally, a number of authors in the information retrieval literature 
have found some use for an area of philosophy that historically has 
often been part of the philosophy of language-formal logic. Aristotle’s 
syllogistic logic is arguably the first serious philosophy of language, and 
over the subsequent centuries logic has been primarily used to model 
formal relationships in language, such as the structure of argument 
and the nature of propositions. The early work in applying logic to the 
problems of IR was by Cooper (1971). More recently there has been a 
contribution by van Rijsbergen (1986a, 1986b, 1989), followed by a com- 
pilation by Crestani, Lalmas, and van Rijsbergen (1998). Crestani et al. 
bring together a nice selection of papers on logic and information 
retrieval. Cooper’s paper defined a logically rigorous notion of relevance 
in information retrieval. The idea of relevance has been the focus of 
much concern and extensive writing, but little agreement. For Cooper, 
a document is relevant to a search query if its text can be used to form 
a “minimal premise set” that could be used to prove the assertion 
implicit in the search query. Although such a formal notion of relevance 
has a fairly narrow application, it does a useful job of establishing the 
boundaries of logical analysis in information retrieval. Some works, 
such as Wilson’s (1973) writing on what he called “situational rele- 
vance” and van Rijsbergen’s (19791, acknowledge an explicit debt to 
Cooper’s seminal paper. 
Conclusion 
This discussion has attempted to provide an overview of some of the 
main ideas in the philosophy of language that have relevance to the 
issues of information retrieval. The philosophy of language is a much 
deeper and broader field of study than could be demonstrated in this 
chapter. Nevertheless, many of the most obvious connections between 
the philosophy of language and information retrieval should be appar- 
ent, and the relevance of the philosophy of language to the problems of 
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information retrieval should be evident. Much good work applying the 
insights of the philosophy of language to  information retrieval remains 
to  be done. 
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